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Conditions for a European intervention 
strategy in application of the ESDP and 
US/Nato crisis management 
I. 
Since the „Petersberg Tasks“ for the „Western European Union“ were 
adopted by the WEU council of foreign ministers in 1992, Europe has em-
barked on forays into the wide field of „hard security“. The Petersberg de-
cisions were a first step towards European participation in international 
peace support with military means, especially „tasks of combat forces in 
crisis management, including peace-making“, as the decision read. Euro-
pean armed forces have been deployed in crisis contingencies, either as the 
improvised „Allied Rapid Reaction Force“ to break up the Serbian circle of 
artillery fire on Sarajevo in 1995 or later under Nato command & control in 
Bosnia, in Macedonia, in Kosovo and since the summer of 2003 in Af-
ghanistan. At the end of 2004 the EU was set to take over from Nato in 
Bosnia as parent organisation for SFOR. 
In IFOR, later SFOR in Bosnia and in KFOR in Kosovo, European troop 
contingents have been used together with US and other foreign forces from 
outside the EU and Nato, in particular with Russians, Ukrainians, Turks, 
Poles, Bulgarians, Romanians and Hungarians, as well as with token ele-
ments from Asian and African countries. Prior to 2004 the EU had no di-
rect part in military operations or crisis deployments but in Macedonia, 
which saw the first EU military presence for stabilization of the internal 
situation. The assumption of responsibility in Bosnia would change this Lothar Rühl 
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European role to a more independent and active one. With SFOR the EU 
will have to run all extra-Nato/EU troop contingents in Bosnia as well, an 
extension of its political-military scope for „robust peace-keeping“ and 
peace stabilization. 
The road to this end, in all likelihood only the next stage of the march into 
further commitments of EU forces, took twelve years since the Petersberg 
conference and just nine years since the incorporation of the European UN-
contingents in Bosnia in IFOR under Nato command and the added partici-
pation of others, such as the German contingent at the end of 1995. In the 
meantime, EU enlargement has added Poland, the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, the three Baltic countries, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus to 
the union and hence to the group of EU members, participating in the 
„European Security and Defence Policy“ framework, for which a European 
security strategy was adopted by the European Council in December 2003. 
Crisis management by intervention with military forces is on the European 
agenda, with rules for deployment and engagement either alone and sepa-
rately from Nato or with Nato back-up, according to the nature, risk and 
extent of the contingency. 
The subsidiarity principle, adopted in June 1999 by the EC at Cologne at 
the end of the Kosovo war, is to ensure that EU crisis response forces 
would neither double Nato forces nor detract from Nato military capabili-
ties or pre-empt Nato to act with its own forces outside collective defence, 
which is said to mean that Nato has „the first call“ for the use of military 
force in international crisis. „Autonomous action“ by the EU via ESDP 
with the „European Rapid Reaction Force“ (ERRF), based on „relevant 
strategic planning“, as the Cologne EC formulated the political terms of 
reference on this critical point, is widely understood to give Europe „a stra-
tegic role“, which,  however, has to be more closely defined in a transatlan-
tic context of co-operation with Nato and the US. (see Esther Brimmer ed., 
„The EU’s Search For A Strategic Role“, Washington DC, 2002 with a 
foreword by Xavier Solana). 
Is „autonomous action“ meant as an exercise in  „strategic autonomy“ of 
the EU, independent from the US and Nato? „Strategic autonomy“ has not Conditions for a European intervention strategy 
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yet been explicitly claimed by the EU, but since 1999 it has been sug-
gested, i.p. in Paris, as the political objective of the ESDP and a European 
military crisis reaction capability of the kind envisaged in the „Helsinki 
Headline Goal“ for a European force under the political authority of the 
EU. President Chirac at times suggested that Europe would have to balance 
American influence if not American power. German chancellor Schröder, a 
friend and close partner of the French president, answered the challenge 
indirectly, by stating in public in 2004 that Germany would have no part in 
„Gegenmachtbildung“, which means „counter-wailing power“ , vis-à-vis 
America. 
This denial was significant for several reasons: Germany had sided with 
France and Russia in 2002-03 in opposing the American war against Iraq 
and demanding a „multipolar“ order in world affairs. A Paris-Berlin-
Moscow axis of political understanding, a new kind of „entente cordiale“, 
seemed to be in the making. This was obviously a common objective in 
Paris and Moscow, at least in the Elysée and in the Kremlin. It need not 
become a base line for opposing Washington across the spectrum of inter-
national issues and it was unlikely that president Putin, who looks for un-
derstanding on mutual interests and  co-operation with the US in a renewal 
of global bilateralism in strategic-nuclear arms control, oil business in Cen-
tral Asia and a return of Russian influence in the Middle East after the Iraq 
war, would seek a political confrontation with the American world power. 
Nor was it ever likely that president Chirac would carry his opposition to 
American supremacy that far afield as to break the transatlantic partnership. 
But there was a risk of alienating Europe from America and vice versa, 
given the American reactions and the US policy in the Middle East with the 
ongoing occupation of Iraq and the mounting risks resulting from it and 
from Arab-Muslim hostility not only towards America but to the West in 
general. The extreme political reaction in Spain due to mishandling of gov-
ernment information after the terror attack of March 11, 2004 in Madrid at 
the end of an election campaign, leading to the reversal of Spanish policy 
and the immediate withdrawal of the Spanish contingent from the coalition 
forces in Iraq, showed the vulnerability not only of the American interna-Lothar Rühl 
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tional position but also of alliance coherence and continuity of commit-
ments. 
The political change in Madrid from a conservative to a socialist govern-
ment and from a close relationship with Washington to a reorientation on 
Europe certainly comforted Berlin as the European alignment of Spain 
closer to the French position vis-à-vis the US pleased Paris as did the re-
duction of Spanish ambitions and the new coalition perspectives within the 
EU and Nato. However, the question arose as to how reliable a partner 
Spain would be in the future under stress and threats. 
Although Berlin continued to oppose any Nato participation in the post-war 
occupation of Iraq and refused to send German soldiers into the country 
under foreign occupation – which amounted to a refusal of any EU military 
„peace consolidation“ presence in Iraq as well – by early 2004 it had be-
come obvious to the German government that the alliance with the US 
needed be mended and the UN involved as soon and as far as possible, in 
order to contain the building storm of insurgency and the trend towards de-
stabilization. At the same time, the German ambition to play a greater role 
at the UN and to occupy a permanent seat in its WSC could only be fur-
thered with American support, even in Europe itself, where Germany does 
not enjoy unmitigated friendships around its borders or an unassailable po-
sition in the EU. The decline of the German economy and armed forces, 
hence of Germany’s international weight and standing in Nato called for a 
more cautious policy vis-à-vis Washington, even towards the unbeloved 
Bush Administration. 
II. 
In order to improve European military capabilities both within Nato and for 
the European Rapid Reaction Force of the EU Germany with its low de-
fence spending must make greater efforts, if only to remain on par with 
Britain and France. Therefore both the European and the German positions 
in the alliance have become even more precarious than before the Balkan 
crises of the 1990ies: The entire ESDP undertaking for crisis reaction needs 
much more and more rapid funding than so far accepted by the EU part-Conditions for a European intervention strategy 
  7
ners. The Afghanistan operation in ISAF taxes European resources and the 
Balkan deployments in SFOR and KFOR, while reduced in numbers, have 
become a costly burden while several European allies have troop deploy-
ments in Iraq as members of the US-led international coalition, technically 
supported by Nato assets. 
Since 1992 the expansion of US spending on defence, in particular on mili-
tary technologies and on the operational capabilities of US forces for con-
ventional as well as for nuclear warfare, has outpaced European resources 
allocation to defence and the American „revolution in military affairs“ has 
reached a point of advance far out of reach of any international competitor, 
let alone the European Nato and EU partners. Therefore „balancing“ US 
power on the 2004 US defence budget level of about 450 billion US $ is 
out of the question for Europe. The issue is how European forces can be 
used together with US forces in combat contingencies, how interoperability 
can be achieved under the new technical conditions, how „mobility, flexi-
bility, sustainability and deployability“ of EU forces (as well as of Euro-
pean Nato forces) can be assured with „interoperability“ as the five „main 
capabilities“ recognized as priority requirements for EU „crisis manage-
ment operations“ by the Cologne EC in 1999 (see Lothar Rühl, Bonn ZEI 
Discussion Paper C54 1999 Conditions and options for an autonomous 
„Common European Policy on Security and Defence „ in and by the Euro-
pean Union). 
The Helsinki force planning goal envisages 60.000 soldiers out of a man-
power pool of about 100 -125.000, 300 combat aircraft and 75 naval ves-
sels, plus 188 transport aircraft and 61 transport ships for longer range de-
ployments up to 6000 km distance from Brussels, probably between 3000 
and 5000 km for insertion into crisis areas or „force projection“ on a larger 
scale. 
This is indeed a „strategic range“ by European geographical measures as 
well as by international standards. In operational and logistical terms ready 
reaction or intervention forces, to be rapidly „projected“ or forward de-
ployed into crisis areas, need ready reserves to replace them by rotation. 
This requirement applies to personnel, to equipment with spare parts, to Lothar Rühl 
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ammunitions, to preservable provisions, to fuel, to medicine and other 
matériel; it begs for adequate war-stocks with appropriate selections of 
goods and a pool of skilled technicians to handle the logistical operations 
as well as a staff for planning and preparation of transports and supply. 
Communications, command & control and strategic reconnaissance have to 
be provided with mobile operational head quarters for command & control 
in the theatre. Above all, the capability has to be threefold, since even with 
six-months-tours for personnel in a „hot“ deployment area instead of one 
year – the envisaged extreme time-limit for troops – in order to organize a 
coherent rotation: one third in theatre, one third preparing for replacement 
and one third in reserve and training. 
A force of 60.000 would be capable of fielding about 20.000 at any time, as 
long as the rotation cycle can be maintained after 18 months. The cases of 
Bosnia with SFOR and Kosovo with KFOR show that one has to count 
with several years even in areas, where there is practically no combat situa-
tion and, all in all, little violence or disorder, compared to Somalia in 1992-
94 and at present in Afghanistan, let alone in „post-war“ Iraq. At the end of 
September 2004 the secretary general of Nato asked for more allied troops 
from Europe in order to bolster and extend the military presence in Af-
ghanistan and to set up more mobile reconstruction teams of ISAF farther 
out in the country, i.p. in the West, for wider stabilization in depth. German 
defence minister Peter Struck, who had coined the phrase  „Germany’s se-
curity must be defended at the Hindukush“, declared „no end in sight“ for 
German foreign military deployments, since the conditions in Afghanistan 
and in the Balkans did not yet allow a withdrawal of international security 
forces. he Therefore the time span for such deployments is much wider 
than had been expected ten years ago. 
The Israeli occupation in the Gaza Strip and in some West Bank areas of 
Palestine with mounting Arab resistance points to the same conclusion, al-
though EU forces would probably not be deployed in such contingencies. 
However, the original idea of swift action and afterwards relative quiet for 
„peace stabilization“ as in Bosnia in a garrison occupation by European 
forces without much risk and danger of armed violence, has to be aban-
doned for ERRF operations now and in the foreseeable future. Conditions for a European intervention strategy 
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The escalation of violence into actual war-fighting with heavy arms fol-
lowed the originally peaceful presence of unarmed humanitarian relief or-
ganisations in Somalia within a short period after these helpers could no 
longer protect their goods and themselves in the interior because of armed 
robbery and growing fighting between bandits or tribes over the control of 
transport and distribution. The case of Somalia shows the ambivalence of 
the contingencies, the risks of escalation and the escalation dynamics in-
herent in crisis even without the provocation by armed forces from outside. 
It also shows the inadequacy of conventional military protection of con-
voys, aid stations, goods and civilian personnel without a strong interven-
tion capability of the type „boots on the ground“ with high mobility, supe-
rior fire-power and operational flexibility, knowledge of land and people 
and rules of engagement which permit timely effective use of arms. 
Is the EU, are the European governments partners ready for such crisis con-
tingencies and escalatory risks? Will the European Rapid Reaction Force 
be ready, by the end of 2010, to meet such circumstances if and when de-
ployed in similar situations? In Afghanistan, the indigenous jury on ISAF is 
still out. The tribal chiefs, some of which are known narcotics barons and 
others are historical war lords or both, have to be counted with as have „the 
remnants“ of Al Qaida and the Taliban. For the 2004 presidential elections, 
the US asked for ground elements of the Nato crisis response force – to 
which it had not yet attached any American troops – in order to protect the 
Afghan voters in some critical places. 
The European allies, led – as usual against American demands – by France, 
refused. French president Chirac, not missing the opportunity offered to 
him, countered that the Nato force was never meant for such missions – 
which is correct – and that ISAF could deal with the situation. ISAF, of 
course, is led by Nato and largely composed of European elements. Chirac 
wished to avoid that the European ISAF would be doubled or overshad-
owed by the US-led Nato force in the military protection of an exercise in 
practical democracy , with US combat forces around, searching for their 
enemies. As things stood in Europe in the autumn of 2004, an EU force 
could not have been successfully deployed in Afghanistan as it could not 
have been in Iraq or as an „interposition force“ in Gaza or Hebron. But Lothar Rühl 
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could Nato have assumed effective control of one of the quieter regions of 
Iraq in 2004, as had been asked by the US ministers Powell and Rumsfeld 
in December 2003 in Brussels? 
The question refers to European inputs in both the EU rapid reaction force 
and the Nato crisis response force, to allied cohesion and to the reality of 
the relationship between the EU and Nato in competition for the resources 
needed to create and maintain intervention capabilities in real contingencies 
for „autonomous“ European „action“ in crisis with military force. 
An independent „Task Force“ of academic experts, set up at the end of 
2001 at the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris and tasked „to select 
the most likely generic crisis scenarios that the EU could face in the dec-
ades to come, to assess the capabilities needed to deal with each of these 
contingencies, to identify the main current shortfalls and to propose reme-
dies and options for adapting European capabilities“ , arrived at the overall 
conclusion that „even if the use of force is a last resort, peacekeeping op-
erations, including police operations, could encounter a hostile environ-
ment“ (see  European defence, A proposal for a White Paper  ISS of the 
European Union, Paris, may 2004, p. 125). In conjunction with the Euro-
pean Security Strategy document of December 2003, in which it is ac-
knowledged that „the European Union is inevitably a global player“ and 
therefore „should be ready to share in the responsibility for global secu-
rity“, the Task Force concluded further that this must be backed up by 
„adequate capabilities“, hence by „readiness and effectiveness of European 
forces, crucial to fulfilment of the Union’s strategic objectives“. 
On this critical point, the Task Force spelled out the long-standing defi-
ciencies and the still unfulfilled requirements: 
•  up to 50 per cent of European forces must become deployable at any 
given time for operations outside the EU or to face consequences of 
catastrophic terrorism. This objective should be achieved within 10 
years (in 2014). In 2004 only 10 percent of the committed forces within 
the Union are deployable: European countries (in EU or Nato) count 
almost 1,5 million soldiers under arms but can only deploy 150.000 
troops. Conditions for a European intervention strategy 
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•  The EU should be able to sustain the deployment of 60.000 combat 
troops in operational units for three years. In 2004 they are unable to 
sustain 50.000 in operation over a number of years, equalling 20 small 
brigades of about 2500 soldiers each. Prior to its enlargement of April 
2004, Nato had collectively 250 combat brigades of which 69 US bri-
gades; less than 80 of those, including 29 US brigades, were considered 
„deployable“, i.e. could be moved with their full combat equipment and 
logistics for operational deployments away from their garrisons. This 
left 51 European „deployable“ combat brigades of which one third, i.e. 
up to 17, could be deployed for operations elsewhere for six months 
with 34 others in various states of readiness for foreign deployments 
outside or in other parts of Europe. The Task Force concluded that „only 
15 to 17 European brigades can be deployed at any given moment; this 
makes (for) a total of approximately 40.000 troops“ for six-months-
deployments, while for shorter interventions into crisis contingencies a 
larger number of the available brigades could be deployed for opera-
tions including combat missions. 
•  For the less demanding „Petersberg missions“ of 1992 vintage, that is 
before the crisis experiences in Somalia, the Balkans, Central Africa, 
Afghanistan and in post-war Iraq, only some elements of the ERRF 
would have to be deployed. But „for the most demanding large-scale, 
sustained combat missions, the full ERRF would have to be deployed. A 
force of 60.000 that includes logistics and combat support cannot carry 
out these kinds of missions. To be able to fulfil the most demanding 
tasks would require at least  60.000 combat forces and, given the ratio of 
combat to non-combat troops, this would imply a pool of 150 - 200.000 
troops“ (see EU ISS document quoted, p. 100/101 and 125). 
III. 
These findings of this Task Force underline three critical realities: First the 
objective competition between Nato and EU for the same operational capa-
bilities, even if battalions could be deployed instead of entire brigades and 
the requirement in numbers smaller than 40-60.000 troops. Second the ne-Lothar Rühl 
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cessity to provide for operational combat units: battalions and brigades or, 
in the current terminology at Brussels, „combat groups“ which suggests 
variable sizes but combat strength in arms and equipment, especially in 
mobile and secure command & control, communications, reconnaissance 
and intelligence analysis for field headquarters with a first priority, spelled 
out in the report. Third a much larger personnel reserve in a manpower 
pool of professionally trained soldiers available for combat, combat support 
and logistics for the fielding of up to 60.000 troops, than has been taken 
into account in the „Helsinki Headgoal“ as the order of magnitude. If 
60.000 combat troops had to be operationally deployed for more than six 
months, by this count an available organized force of at least 120.000 com-
bat troops and as much combat support and logistics troops would have to 
be made available at various stages of operational readiness. 
The American experience in Iraq since April 2003, when the actual cam-
paign ended, shows that for occupation and mobile control of an unsafe 
area with only up to 10.000 insurgents and armed bandits a large force and 
a continuous rotation are needed. The situation in Afghanistan was consid-
ered unsafe and potentially explosive, in any case a high risk contingency, 
by the Nato military committee in 2003-2004. This situation was character-
ized by a multitude of small incidents but daily losses of life and endemic 
insecurity for the Iraqi population in the cities and towns, an obvious lack 
of control by the US forces and fighting in several hot spots such as 
Samarra, Falludja, Bakuba or Ramadi in the „Sunnite triangle“ north-west 
of Baghdad, the centre of old Baa’tist resistance and terrorism by foreign 
elements, and south of Baghdad in the Shiite holy cities of Nadjaf and Ker-
bala by radical Shiite fundamentalist insurgents fighting for power in the 
Shiite majority and using the foreign occupation as their hostile target to 
back up their political legitimacy in terms of national resistance, as was the 
case in parts of Baghdad. 
However, there never was any local victory over the foreign occupation 
forces or any land-wide uprising in spite of the many appeals for support of 
the insurgency. Therefore, the ambivalent terms of „insurgency“ and „guer-
rilla warfare“, used since the early summer 2003 by the US military com-
manders, i.p. by the commander-in-chief general Abizaid, and uncritically Conditions for a European intervention strategy 
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reproduced by the media, which often equal noise with action, do not trans-
late the reality on the ground: There is organized guerrilla on a large scale, 
however in a scattered way with an uneven pattern, but no „warfare“ like in 
Vietnam on the part of the insurgents. American losses are not critical with 
about 1000 casualties killed in action since March 2003 at the end of Sep-
tember 2004, which means around 900 since the end of the „major military 
operations“ at the end of April 2003: For a force of 135.000 US soldiers in 
Iraq this is a ratio of less than one per cent. In Vietnam the US forces, 
numbering more than half a million at the height of the war in 1967-70, lost 
on average about 6000 killed in action per year, 58.000 in all between 1965 
and 1973. 
The comparison with Vietnam is misleading on several accounts. But in 
psychological-political terms there is an emerging similarity: The trend to-
wards a spread of insecurity and a stiffening of armed resistance. These are 
signs of the internal dynamics of escalation and intensified crisis playing 
themselves out; they show, clearly again after Bosnia and Kosovo, that es-
calation is not only working from outside into a crisis, as Nato escalation 
did in 1995 with success to end the Bosnian war, but that it as works from 
inside out, as it had done before 1995 between Croatia und Bosnia and 
again in 1998/99 from the civil war in Kosovo across the borders into Ma-
cedonia as well as from Albania into Kosovo. Escalation spreads violence 
and war in situations without foreign involvement, let alone intervention, as 
the many African examples show, the latest in the Darfur province of Su-
dan 2003-04, where, however, foreign interests (Chinese for oil drilling and 
Russian for selling arms to the government in Khartoum) are at work as 
well. 
To check interior escalation of crises and internal conflicts should be the 
first and main purpose of intervention as a strategy for international secu-
rity. In order to be successful in a strategic sense in the service of a political 
objective beyond „stabilisation“ of an unstable, chaotic or revolutionary 
situation or of a transition from peace to civil war or to a war of secession 
for independence (as in disintegrating Yugoslavia), that is of a set of cir-
cumstances which cannot be made „stable“ since such constellations are Lothar Rühl 
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inherently unstable, intervention from abroad must based in escalation 
dominance for control of the situation and further developments. 
Dominance and control of the situation cannot be pre-ordained by policy-
makers, strategic planners or military commanders. They are the result of a 
balance of forces on the ground favourable to the intervening power or coa-
lition of states, of appropriate policies with regard to the contingency, real-
istic political and strategic objectives in a reasonable time-frame and the 
adequate use of force, supported by political measures (or vice versa). Af-
ghanistan since October 2001 and Iraq since march 2003 are cases in point: 
Intervention has its own politics, meaning that compromises must be made 
with various political, social, religious and even criminal forces in the thea-
tre. Military action cannot be pursued independently from political opera-
tions and conditions. This was already shown to Nato in Bosnia and in 
Kosovo, it has been shown since in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Military tac-
tics of occupation forces are not completely different from military tactics 
in general, but they have to be combined with police tactics and military-
civil co-operation. 
Intervention forces cannot be used indiscriminately as occupation forces. 
But both Afghanistan and Iraq show that „light forces“ with armed „social 
workers“ , as had been one of the favourite European ideas about „peace 
keeping“ in the early 1990ies, will not do. Heavy armoured equipment is 
not a thing of the past in „asymmetrical warfare“. When the situation got 
rough and out of hand in parts of Iraq during 2004, the US command re-
versed its 2003 post-campaign preference for light forces and deployed the 
armoured battalions of the two heavy divisions from Germany to back up 
the US Marines in Nadjaf, Kerbala and Kufa in the Shiite region as well as 
for the control of Baghdad and in the „Sunnite triangle“ for the offensive 
operations to take back the cities of Samarra, later of Falludja and Ramadi, 
lost to the terrorists, bandits and guerrilla groups during 2004 after the pre-
mature break-off of the spring offensives for political reasons, which had to 
do with the Iraqi interim government and the electoral prospects of the 
politicians, eager to perform as peacemakers and mediators, albeit without 
lasting success: In Samarra less than 1000 „insurgents“ and „foreign fight-
ers“ had held a city of 200.000 inhabitants hostage to their guns for almost Conditions for a European intervention strategy 
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six months, until they were finally dislodged at the end of September 2004 
by US and Iraqi government forces. 
Intervention needs massive troop deployments in order to show force and 
hold operational reserves ready, to patrol the roads and streets and  to exer-
cise widespread control in the country. The US troop deployments in Iraq 
as in Afghanistan were to small for this purpose: Winning in the open field 
and taking cities by offensive may need less forces if the combination of 
protection, fire-power and mobility as well as the control of the air can op-
pose superior power and quality to superior numbers and rule the battle-
fields. Occupation of large countries needs large forces, but also force pro-
tection, operations security, information, reconnaissance in depth, contacts 
with the people and police skills. This combination in an order of magni-
tude that provides for sufficient ready operational reserves and heavy arms 
back-up is necessary to cover hidden as well as visible risks. 
Risk-taking is one of the most difficult arts in warfare as in politics or in 
marketing. Risks do change and may appear or grow suddenly. Escalation 
is about changing of risks and hence about careful risk-taking both in plan-
ning and in improvisation during operations and occupation deployments. 
Intervention must be placed on risk evaluation and risk avoidance, as far as 
possible, but in the last analysis on betting on risks, which cannot be cov-
ered fully. This is another lesson from Afghanistan, but much more so from 
Iraq as it is from the Israeli incursions and occupation in Palestine. In Iraq 
the major physical risks to troops of the occupation so far have been road-
side explosions, automobile bomb attacks and sniper fire from hidden posi-
tions. 
These risks are typical of terrorist and guerrilla operations, but they are of 
limited effect on armoured forces and reinforced positions, as long as there 
is a free field of fire to hold back automobile bomb attacks before they can 
reach a barrage or defensive perimeter, which is difficult and often not 
compatible with the political purpose of the occupation as well as impracti-
cal for the exercise of control and for reassurance of the population. Mili-
tary camps can always be attacked from somewhere, if only by rocket and Lothar Rühl 
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mortar fire from a distance. But such attacks are seldom critical to the secu-
rity of the camps so long as there is built-in protection. 
Road-side bombs and automobile attacks as well as sniper fire cannot de-
feat occupation forces, even less operational forces in the field. But they 
can create insecurity for the public, cause massive civilian losses of life and 
destruction, hence defeat the political purpose of the military occupation or 
short-term intervention deployments, which is security and freedom of 
movement for the population, protection of valuable sites such as oil pipes, 
water wells and power lines, of administrative buildings and infrastructure. 
Unprotected civilian engineers, truck drivers, humanitarian relief workers 
and business people cannot perform under growing danger of being at-
tacked or taken hostage. This is the main challenge to any post-intervention 
occupation for reconstruction or stabilisation. 
As long as the dynamics of intervention are in play and the superior mili-
tary force over-whelms any resistance – Afghanistan in the late autumn of 
2001 or Iraq in march-April 2003 – „asymmetrical“ warfare of the stronger 
against the weaker party suppresses the latter’s arms, organisation and op-
tions: the asymmetry is in favour of the intervening power. Guerrilla tactics 
and terrorist attacks cannot stop the intervention nor really harm the attack-
ing army, let alone air force or naval force. This was the case during the 
offensive of the US ground forces in Iraq from Kuwait to Baghdad and be-
yond into the „Sunnite triangle“, Tikrit and towards Mosul in the north. 
Had the US been permitted by Turkey to land an army corps in Southern 
Anatolia from the sea and create a second front for a dual offensive against 
Baghdad, the effect would have been even more dramatic and the campaign 
even shorter. Even on one front with three offensive axis from south to 
north, the thrust of the allied forces was tremendous in spite of sand storms, 
heavy rains, local resistance and guerrilla-type attacks on the supply col-
umns on the roads. Allied losses were insignificant, destructions limited 
with only little „collateral damage“ and Iraqi losses including civilians 
somewhere between 10.000 and 30.000 persons killed, mostly soldiers and 
paramilitary fighters. A stronger and better-led army could have put up a 
stiffer resistance. But even against are more competent and energetic oppo-
sition, the thrust of the US-British offensive would have achieved the Conditions for a European intervention strategy 
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break-through within a few weeks more, however with heavier losses and 
in fiercer fighting. The problem of military intervention lies less in the 
combat operations than in the control of land and population afterwards. 
The situation in Iraq in 2003-04 made the major physical risks to the pur-
pose of intervention and occupation perfectly clear. 
Intervention must lead to occupation if the positive result of intervening is 
to be protected until indigenous forces under stable political authority of 
the country or region in question can assume responsibility for maintaining 
order and security. This is the obvious dilemma of the US/British occupa-
tion in Iraq and the problem for ISAF and the US combat forces in Af-
ghanistan. The scenarios for intervention by EU forces, whether military 
units or civilian police or both, must be defined accordingly: The favourite 
scenario in the EU concept of intervention with the ERRF for ESDP pur-
poses is a rapid and swiftly executed operation. The EU Institute for Secu-
rity Studies report of may 2004 „European defence“ points to time-
frameworks of up to six months, however with the proviso of rotation af-
terwards for replacement of the first deployment. Short time span for action 
is always the ideal case in all military intervention planning as it is in all 
guerrilla attack tactics: For the regular military it means ‘fast in, fast out’, 
for the guerrilla ‘hit and run’. 
In the asymmetrical warfare situations between indigenous guerrilla forces 
and terrorist groups operating from the underground, hidden in the popula-
tion or somewhere in the depth of the countryside, and the military forces 
the swift attacker from nowhere will always be at an advantage and does 
not need to be successful all the time or even most of the time. The military 
force needs time and space for the optimal use of its own superiority in 
mobile operations, free fields of fire and clearly visible or at least detect-
able targets for its weapons and an evolution of the tactical situation that 
permits the combination of armoured protection, fire power and mobility to 
impact on the adversary. 
The loss of free room for manoeuvre and distance to the enemy in the Pal-
estinian towns and refugee camps is the main reason for the reduced effec-
tiveness of the Israeli army in the position war of occupation with limited Lothar Rühl 
18   
incursions. The same problem confronts the US army in Iraq. However, the 
American forces seem to cope better with this situation, since they have 
combined armoured and light dismounted units for street fighting and as-
sault on positions in towns, where the urban guerrilla digs in and so looses 
its own strength of the swift surprise attack. Asymmetrical warfare cuts 
both ways: Guerrilla forces and terrorists are not always favoured by it and 
the asymmetries change with the topography, the light of day and night as 
do the risks. The night-sight equipment of US forces offers them a distinct 
and often decisive advantage over the Iraqi guerrilla and the terrorists in 
night-fighting. It is important, therefore, to equip European forces in the 
same way to give them asymmetrical technical advantages to balance those 
on the other side, which would be fighters with small arms, rockets and 
mortars, mines and bombs made of artillery munitions. 
The deployment of armour and artillery, attack helicopters and superior re-
connaissance and battlefield information assets, mobile communications 
and precision-guided munitions can reverse the asymmetry problem at least 
under some tactical conditions. Operational mobility and fire power in pro-
tective vehicles plus air-to-ground fire support is the combination for suc-
cess with small losses in asymmetrical situations as well as in conventional 
warfare. Main Battle Tanks are still of much use in contingencies of oppo-
sition by strong or numerous forces, even scattered in the landscape or in 
urban guerrilla situations. However, there are limitations as well: First, 
heavy arms such as 50 to 70 ton MBT’s are difficult and costly to move 
over distance if there is no road or railway to be used. The Nato military 
authorities sought railway links from Southern Russia to Central Asia in 
2003 for ground transport of the many heavy loads of provisions for the 
force in Afghanistan. Second, guerrilla fighters and terrorists, that blend 
into the local background and are visible only for short moments, cannot be 
fixed by the most advanced reconnaissance assets for effective targeting or 
even reliable identification. In Iraq in 2003-04 as in Afghanistan „hostile 
losses“ often include unarmed civilians not associated with fighters or ter-
rorists. Third, there should be a proportional correlation between the politi-
cal aim, the strategic objectives, the tactical targets and the means em-
ployed by the military force, which is to the advantage of the intervening or Conditions for a European intervention strategy 
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occupying power: Otherwise, the war can be won and the peace lost – as 
was the risk of the post-campaign occupation and „counter-insurgency“ 
operations by the „Coalition Forces“ under US-command in Iraq. 
The combination of lighter and heavier forces with armoured protection 
and support had not been provided for in Iraq and had to be improvised 
over many months with time lost and the known effect of the spread vio-
lence, crime, terrorism and finally the guerrilla from the underground. The 
European allies in Nato had good reasons in 2003-04 not to field more 
forces in a situation, that demanded more forces but particularly risky for 
all foreign soldiers, even outside the hot-houses of terrorism, banditism and 
guerrilla activities. In Afghanistan the situation was less dramatic but still 
full of barely hidden risks for ISAF under Nato authority. The lessons for 
future EU force deployments and interventions with troops into conflict 
situations, even „post-war“ contingencies for„peace consolidation“  or for 
„peace enforcement“  and „preventive deployments“ (see the 1992 UN 
WSC „Agenda for Peace“) are simple, clear and compelling: 
Overwhelming power is needed for successful intervention with military 
force, but cannot accomplish the task alone. Armoured force is needed in 
all contingencies as back-up for the operational light forces that have to do 
the daily work of patrolling and reassuring. Only heavy forces, which can 
protect themselves and intervene decisively, support the lighter forces and 
the military police, can exercise escalation dominance and physical control 
of the situation. The light, dismounted US forces and the supply convoys 
with unarmoured lorries in Iraq took more than 90 per cent of the casualties 
in fighting and by hidden snipers, surprise attacks and roadside bomb ex-
plosions. The ratio of hostile casualties to US casualties was never below 
ten to one and, on average, with armoured US forces in longer or fiercer 
exchanges of fire often 100 to 1. These ratios and the use of different forces 
in Iraq have been carefully studied by Nato military authorities as US tac-
tics have been critically examined. Lothar Rühl 
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IV. 
The provisional conclusion in the autumn of 2004 in Brussels was that 
European forces must be equipped and tailored accordingly: Direct air-to-
ground support by armoured combat helicopters and fighter-bombers with 
precision-guided air-to-ground weapons and heavy machine-guns, light ar-
tillery, mortars, medium to heavy tanks and armoured fighting vehicles, 
armoured troop carriers with special protection against land mines, mobile 
and armoured combat engineer equipment and always a combination of 
lighter and heavier mobile forces from battalion level upwards. As of 2004 
the EU could not field such operational forces packages in „combat 
groups“ of brigade strength beyond perhaps two or three with experienced 
soldiers, mostly from Britain and France. In the recent past European forces 
have been deployed for „robust“ peace keeping and peace making or peace 
consolidation under much easier conditions for survival and accomplish-
ment of mission than in Iraq or even in Afghanistan. While the UN had 
more than 100.000 military peacekeepers („blue helmets“) in various de-
ployments in 1993-94, the peak-time of its interventions in crisis contin-
gencies, of which only 2,342 Europeans, the 15 EU countries have fielded 
since 1991 a total of 41.111 soldiers in various peace support operations: 
32.288 with the Nato-controlled IFOR/SFOR, KFOR and ISAF, 5.480 in 
various UN-related international military security missions, the bulk of the 
grand total in the Balkans: 28.797. These numbers represent personnel de-
ployments without taking troop rotation into account. 
What can be deduced from these facts and data for future EU force de-
ployments for crisis response be the ERRF in implementation of the ESDP? 
1. While smaller contingencies allow for smaller numbers, intervention ca-
pability has to be held ready for swift operational deployments over long 
distances and at least for 6 to 12 months, in order to sustain an active, self-
protective and useful military presence in a risk situation. 
2. The air component is essential in all contingencies for reconnaissance, 
surveillance, air-to-ground support and direct air attack on strong positions, 
as well as for psychological reasons of deterrence. Conditions for a European intervention strategy 
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3. The naval component needs capability for swift landing outside ports on 
stretches of unfriendly coastlines with access into the interior (the Somalia 
problem), which means roll-on/roll-off cargo ships for heavy equipment 
and assault ships for amphibious operations as well as helicopter carriers 
and frigates or destroyers for fire support. 
4. Special forces must be organized and made interoperable with US forces, 
in order to serve for prevention of catastrophic terror attacks against Europe 
with nuclear, chemical or other toxic agents. 
5. Incremental – step by step – intervention with small forces at the begin-
ning is always a high risk undertaking, since the dynamics of internal esca-
lation can outpace the possible reinforcements. 
6. Use of military force as a „last resort“ is politically wise, as long as the 
military option does not decay or degrade over time while the search for 
political solutions continues into protracted talks, which offer the adversary 
or the feuding parties in a crisis the advantage of staging their assets in 
safety, prepare for aggression and assume an international posture, giving 
them an apparent recognition and legitimacy in their political fight, staking 
out claims and finding external support. 
„Ultima ratio“ or last resort must not be understood to mean that military 
force should only be employed, if and when „all other means are ex-
hausted“. No reasonable policy or strategy can be based on the assumption 
that policy and diplomacy must first „exhaust“ all their means (and the 
country or populations with them), before using force. One of the most 
devastating experiences in the policy of „last resort“ was the Bosnian war 
1993-95, which tore the country apart and cost the lives of at least 250.000 
people, while Europe and America were exhausting their political options 
before intervention. The same applies to the UN. A similar case presented 
itself in the Darfur conflict in Western Sudan 2004. 
This is the political lesson from Bosnia, Kosovo, Sudan, the Congo and 
other crises theatres. The EU was exemplary in defeating itself and its own 
political objectives between early 1992 and late 1995 in Yugoslavia with its 
various schemes of political pressure, sanctions, mediation offers without 
the back-up by deterrence power and intervention capability. The war raced Lothar Rühl 
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on, driven by the dynamics of its internal escalation and the tendency to 
extreme violence, while Europe had neither a coherent policy nor an effec-
tive diplomacy, but no other choice for lack of a military intervention capa-
bility and escalation dominance. The latter does not necessarily mean com-
plete control of the situation or the opposing forces. But it does mean the 
initiative for controlled escalation of the conflict and the power to do so, in 
order to change the balance of options and bring about a military decision 
on the ground, on which a political solution can be imposed or negotiated. 
Bosnia in the summer of 1995 is the optimal example: intervention by air 
offensive over 11 days and nights against selected targets of the Bosnian 
Serb forces and political command, general armistice with Belgrade’s con-
currence, negotiations, the Dayton agreement and the Paris peace treaty for 
Bosnia with a political reconstruction programme, UN mandate and politi-
cal authority, Nato military control and IFOR/SFOR all between the sum-
mer and the end of the year 1995. The escalation of the conflict by Nato 
intervention and US support for the Croatians and the Muslim Bosniaks led 
to the end of bloodshed, „ethnic cleansing“ and of the war. 
What are the lessons for European intervention policies and strategies? Of 
the five different contingencies, to be considered for European military cri-
sis response: 
•  a large-scale peace support operation as in the Balkans or in Afghani-
stan, 
•  a high-intensity humanitarian intervention as in Somalia or in Central 
Africa, 
•  regional warfare in the defence of strategic European interests, as the 
Gulf war of 1990-91 after the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, 
•  prevention of an attack involving means of mass destruction, 
•  homeland defence against terrorist attacks, each, even the last one, could 
lead into major armed conflict and escalate into a case for massive 
armed intervention in a theatre of war. 
Therefore, the dynamics of escalation and the increase in intervention 
forces have to be considered. Military intervention has to be seen as a strat-Conditions for a European intervention strategy 
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egy for the achievement of political objectives, even if at first it is used as a 
tactical operation to fix a problem in a crisis and contain the forces of con-
flict in an area such as Somalia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Rwanda or Darfur. Of 
course, local and limited interventions with small mobile forces for hu-
manitarian assistance  or the protection of relief missions are possible and 
can be conducted with good prospects of success without the engagement 
of combat forces. But all crises have the inherent potential for escalation, 
that can run away if not checked at the start and create a larger conflict. 
This kind of indigenous escalation usually takes place in situations, where 
external influence may still be small or even non-existing.  The question 
then arises: Is it necessary or opportune to send a small force to stabilize 
the situation, keep the opponents apart, if this were still possible, seal off 
the crisis area, protect and back up civilian mediation, humanitarian assis-
tance, police operations or whatever may seem possible and useful? 
It is not possible, to offer a reasonable response in general terms. All de-
pends on the circumstances in the contingency area, on the nature of the 
conflict and of the adversaries, on their respective claims and aims and on 
the measure of political interest of the parties in their international relations 
and on the foreign influence that could be brought into balance. Macedonia 
on the verge of a civil war offers such an example. European mediation and 
preventive deployment of a small force to shield the border region from 
incursions but also to dissuade armed activists from provoking larger scale 
violence, to limit the growth of armaments and the multiplication of party 
„militias“ succeeded in restabilising the country. Would this have been 
possible outside Europe or without the distant prospect for Macedonia to 
accede one day to the EU? Would it have been possible in a much larger 
country or outside the sphere of euro-atlantic security in the Balkans? 
At the beginning of the Balkan wars in 1992 , when the Yugoslav crisis 
escalated and the composite political artefact Yugoslavia, a construct of 
1919, began to disintegrate in wars of secession, European thinking on cri-
sis intervention was concentrated on the use of force as „last resort“ only. 
But force was being used in Yugoslavia and the internal escalation set the 
pace of the crisis development first in Slovenia under Serbo-Croat attack by 
the regular Yugoslav federal army, than in Croatia against the Serbs, finally Lothar Rühl 
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in Bosnia-Herzegovina between the Bosnian Serbs, the Muslim Bosniaks 
and the Croats from Herzegovina. Serbia and Croatia, the latter having pro-
claimed its sovereign independence as had Slovenia in early 1992, sup-
ported their respective population groups in the Bosnian war. 
During this entire year as well as during 1993 and the first part of 1994 
there was no foreign military intervention and yet the crisis escalated by its 
own force and for its own reasons with ever intensifying dynamics. Only in 
1994 did Nato begin to support the UN „protection force“ in Bosnia, that 
could no longer protect anybody, not even itself under attack, by low flying 
fighter aircraft but not using arms. European countries such as France and 
Germany supported beleaguered Bosnian communities with relief goods 
from the air but did nothing to break the siege, a reluctance, that led to the 
massacres, of which Srebrenica became the symbol in 1995. After a loss of 
a quarter million of human lives and the greatest humanitarian catastrophe 
in Europe since the end of 1945 with at least two and a half million war 
refugees and people forced to leave their homes under threat of death in the 
„ethnic cleansing“ campaigns, president Clinton finally resigned himself to 
armed intervention by air to save Sarajevo from utter destruction. Nato was 
given the task of silencing the Serbian artillery from the air. The European 
allies consented to participate within the Nato structure of „Allied Com-
mand Europe“ under American leadership. The EU, organized since 1993 
by the Union Treaty of Maastricht (1991), had no military arm and could 
not act on the ground or from the air. The WEU, „revitalized“ (a French 
governmental term) since 1984 in a long drawn out diplomatic process of 
little effect, could have fielded some naval and air force components, as it 
did with a small flotilla of warships in the Adriatic Sea, but could not have 
conducted a military intervention, let alone a campaign in the Balkans. 
Only Nato could act, once Washington had permitted it to do so and con-
sented to commit US forces. 
The case of the Bosnian war 1993-95 is the telling example of the politics 
of „incrementalism“, that is of intervening politically by half without a 
military back-up and without deterrence or even influence on the warring 
opponents, then increasing the pressure of sanctions and parcelling out 
small military forces on the ground under an international „mandate“ by the Conditions for a European intervention strategy 
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UN, which did only allow the deployed „blue helmets“ of the UN force to 
use their arms in self-defence when under direct attack. Most of these un-
fortunate soldiers were from Europe. Britain and France had fielded the 
largest contingents. Force was not supposed to be applied to achieve the 
aim of the mission and protect the people as refugees in the UN „safe heav-
ens“ under hostile fire. This strange situation of intervention ‘à demi’ was 
politically controlled by a special representative of the UN secretary gen-
eral, whose headquarters were in a hotel in the Croatian capital Zagreb and 
who had to be asked for permission to use force in each and every case. His 
part in the conflict was called after his name „the Akashi factor“ for the 
retarding moment in decision making (Akashi is a former Japanese diplo-
mat and ten years later still in the service of the UN). When Nato formed 
the IFOR/SFOR after the general armistice and the Dayton agreement in 
1995 the Supreme Allied Commander Europe put three conditions to the 
allied governments: Unity of responsibility and authority for the chain of 
military command over the deployed forces and the territory. Once the mis-
sion defined, no political interference by the North Atlantic Council or any 
government. Freedom of tactical decisions within wide rules of engage-
ment for the use of armed force to fulfil the mission. Three US generals, 
Shalikashvili, Joulwan and Clark, maintained this demand as Supreme Al-
lied Commanders and US Commanders-in-Chief Europe. 
The EU authorities will have to act by such rules if their ESDP crisis re-
sponse is to be successful. In order to use the military option, the capabili-
ties have to be created. The ISS report from Paris (o.c. May 2004) spells 
out the requirements for the objectives in case of each of the five generic 
scenarios or possible kinds of crisis contingencies for ESDP operations. 
2010 is a late date, but the EU needs the delay in order to organize inter-
vention capabilities. The end of 2003, at first envisaged, was much too am-
bitious. The crucial condition for successful intervention will always be a 
matter of time: the greatest risk is in the „too little and too late“ approach. 
Premature action is not to be feared in Europe, since the decision-making 
processes in the EU and for ESDP activities are insurmountable obstacles 
against voluntarist individual or national reactions. It is impossible even for 
the European Council and its future President to proclaim „Europe at war“ Lothar Rühl 
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in case of an attack like that of September 11 on America. The national 
governments and parliaments would first have to concur in the evaluation 
of the challenge and the risk-taking, then would have to consent to the use 
of the EU forces and make their national contingents available for opera-
tions. For this reason, the political and military crisis consultations are the 
critical part of the process and time is the critical factor. ZEI DISCUSSION PAPER:   Bisher erschienen / Already published: 
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